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Central Counterparties (CCPs) are widely promoted as a requirement for
safe banking [BCB11a, BCB11b, BCB12], with little dissent except on technical
grounds (such as proliferation of CCPs) [DZ11, Sin12]. Whilst CCPs can have
major operational positives, we argue that CCPs have many of the business
characteristics of Rating Agencies, and face similar business pressures. Thus
we see a risk that prices from CCPs may develop the characteristics attributed
to ratings from Rating Agency pre-crisis [TE07, BD09, Sta11]. Business over-
reliance on ratings of questionable accuracy is seen as a cause of the financial
crisis [Par08, Sta11]. We see the potential for same situation to be repeated
with prices from CCPs. Thus the regulatory emphasis on CCPs, rather than
on collateralization, may create the preconditions for an avoidable repeat of the
financial crisis.
The outline of the paper is as follows: we first describe the functions of a
CCP, highlighting how they are carried out; then we give CCP business char-
acteristics, comparing and contrasting them with Rating Agencies; next we
develop the potential consequences. We conclude by emphasising the key risk
mechanism (complacency with CCP prices) and our recommendation (avoid
privileging any price source or method).
CCP Functions
The main function of a CCP is to remove credit risk transmission by interme-
diating trades and by only doing collateralized trades. A CCP does not remove
credit risk. CCPs only block one credit risk transmission route: direct counter-
party exposure. If there is a systematic crisis, e.g. assets dropping suddenly in
value, CCPs offer no protection. The issue in a systematic asset price crisis is
not counterparty exposure but credit risk from asset value (or rather, the lack
of it). Indeed since CCPs transform credit risk transmission into liquidity risk
[Gre12] and since they actualize market volatility on a day-to-day basis, CCPs
may actually increase default risks [KS12b].
A CCP must set prices on all its trades in order to call, or return, collateral.
In general CCPs base prices as far as possible on transaction prices from the
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channels that they work with (exchanges, ECNs, brokers). Does this means
that CCP prices are correct? By definition a transaction price is correct for that
transaction because that is where two counterparties were willing to do business
at that point in time. This does not mean that those prices have significance
beyond the actual transaction; nor does it mean that the prices are stable over
time. All CDO tranche prices that were transacted were correct (by definition)
at transaction time. Their future value was highly variable.
A CCP may use and publish pricing methods, or pricing principles so its
counterparties can reproduce its prices. The CME has stated that it prices swap
futures using a patented method licensed from Goldman Sachs [CW12]. The fact
that a CCP uses a pricing method does not mean that it is correct in the sense
of having a longterm validity, for example LCH changed from Libor discounting
to OIS discounting for its portfolio of swaps on 29 June 2010 for USD, EUR and
GBP [LCH10]. Pricing methods change. Clarity of pricing method, whatever
the level of industry use, is no guarantee of long term validity, as the CDO crisis
made painfully obvious. This does not mean that the principle of no-arbitrage
is violated, just that its application depends on the circumstances, and these
change (assuming that it is used).
CCPs encourage professional handling of collateral by requiring collateral-
ized trades, this is a major operational positive. The Lehman default, and other
defaults, showed just how badly collateral can be managed by financial institu-
tions [CS10, KS12a]. It might be imagined, given the vast sums involved, that
collateral would be treated with care. However, from a profit perspective — his-
torically — there has been little motivation. Today it is becoming evident that
collateral management will form a key part of profitability and has significant
effects on pricing [FST11, Pit12].
Business Characteristics
We start from Rating Agencies and see where their business characteristics have
similarities with CCPs, either in general, or pre-crisis.
Rating Agencies form an oligopoly with high barriers to entry. CCPs are in
a similar situation. It is hard to set up a new CCP: regulators must provide
recognition; channels and direct clients must be persuaded why this new CCP
is better than existing CCPs, they must set up new (and expensive) physical
and logical connections. If national CCPs become commonplace with Basel III
then the oligopoly situation will be repeated nationally.
Ratings are widely used and have a privileged position in many contexts:
firm articles of associations (e.g. permitted investments); law (e.g. permit-
ted investments by government bodies); regulations (e.g. determining capital
requirements). Similarly prices from CCPs are privileged in that any firm want-
ing to have the regulatory benefit of using a CCP (lower capital) must accept
the prices from the CCP. It is also envisaged that by law, in some jurisdictions,
some trade types will have to be traded through a CCP. In this situation coun-
terparties have no choice but to accept CCP prices. Thus CCP pricing is on
track to gain a level of widespread use and privilege similar to Ratings.
Pre-crisis Rating Agencies faced pressure to increase their product coverage
because of the privileges of official ratings, and did so. This gained Rating
Agencies significant extra revenue. In 2006 Moody’s reported that Structured
finance (largely CDOs) accounted for 44% of their income, for Fitch the propor-
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tion was 51% [TE07]. Given the regulatory benefits to clients of using CCPs,
we see CCPs facing the same business pressure from clients (and regulators) to
increase product coverage.
Rating Agencies supply a good (ratings) whose quality has little direct effect
on them. If a rating suddenly has to be changed by a large amount it is not
the Rating Agency that suffers a direct consequence (apart from reputation).
As part of the CCP function they supply a good (prices) whose quality also has
little direct effect on them. All CCP trades are back to back, collateralized,
and have Initial Margins. If the prices, or pricing methodologies, are found to
require significant widespread change, CCPs have little direct risk.
Rating Agencies face the usual business pressures of competition, and hence
the pressure to increase revenue and/or reduce costs. Competition between
CCPs is already being stoked by cost comparisons between them [Sha12].
Consequences
The two most significant potential consequences of the similarities in business
characteristics between CCPs and Rating Agencies are linked:
• an assumed safety from having CCPs may produce a complacency that
CCP prices and pricing methods are correct in terms of having long term
validity or stability;
• the privileged status of CCP prices may grow over time, for example we
can imagine Asset Managers being required by law to use CCP prices
internally.
These consequences essentially concern quality and reliability of prices and pric-
ing methods, how they are regarded in general, in regulations, and legally.
Whilst CCPs keep to vanilla products then these risks may be limited, al-
though they will still be present as the Libor to OIS example above demon-
strates. However, as competitive pressures move CCPs towards new and more
complex products, as Rating Agencies moved into more complex and profitable
products, these risks will increase. We can expect a wave of new products to
devised in response to regulations, for example to mitigate capital requirements.
This has already started with the introduction of swap futures on the CME and
so the potential risks are already appearing.
What were the consequences of perceived poor quality ratings pre-crisis on
Rating Agencies? No Rating Agency went bankrupt. It is only now, four years
later, that there has been a single significant legal judgment against Rating
Agency practices pre-crisis [Jag12]. What lessons might a CCP draw from this
history?
Where an oligopoly delivers services that are difficult to reproduce, author-
ities may be reluctant to reduce that number, whatever the quality of those
services. If they reduce the number by one, as effectively happened after the
Enron and Worldcom accounting events, then the reluctance to act again may
be significantly higher. This appears analogous to the situation with Rating
Agencies: not too-big-to-fail but perhaps too-difficult-to-replace.
Pre-crisis how could a deal team get the rating that they wanted for a given
deal? There is increasing evidence that shopping around for favorable ratings
was widespread [BD09, GNT12], just apart from deal teams working closely with
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Rating Agencies to achieve a particular rating [TE07, Jag12]. We can similarly
imagine major customers working closely with CCPs on pricing methodologies,
which may already be happening [CW12]. Alternatively, clients can move to
the CCP that has prices that are favorable to them.
Since CCPs face normal business pressures they will try to decrease their
costs. Quants are expensive so we can envisage significant pressure to have the
minimum required. Traditionally banks have been perceived to pay quants more
than service providers (however important) so it may be difficult for CCPs to
hold on to their most skilled staff. This produces a secondary issue, when clients
dispute prices or methodologies with the CCP, the CCP will be under double
pressure to agree: firstly the clients may go elsewhere, and secondly the client
quants may be perceived to be more skilled (although clearly not disinterested).
How much confidence in institutional prices is reasonable? Those capable of
finding out that the correct price is different have no motivation to publicize the
fact. They can simply trade in the favorable direction. Alternatively, they can
take positions and then publicize the correct pricing method, aiming to profit as
the market standard changes. There are limits to this arbitrage because CCPs
typically require increasing IM with increasing exposure which at some point
would render such trades uneconomic. However, limits do not mean that it will
not happen.
Conclusions
If there are privileged prices from institutions then the pre-conditions for a new
financial crisis based on over-reliance on those prices are in place. This would
be an avoidable re-run of the perceived contribution of over-reliance of official
ratings to the previous financial crisis [Par08, Sta11].
The key point is not to have prices with privileged status from any source.
This is doubly true when those privileges can increase. Essentially we advocate
a skepticism towards making pricing systematically institutional with legal and
regulatory privileges. This is a direct consequence of privileging CCPs in terms
of capital over, for example, bilateral collateralization1. The primary function of
CCPs, removal of credit risk transmission, is accomplished by collateralization
with initial margins. It is not clear that a CCP is a requirement. If the removal of
credit risk transmission is desired then we advocate equal regulatory treatment
of all equivalent collateralization arrangements. Collateralization itself does not
require institutionally privileged prices.
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